

From 'Flocking for Rights' to the Politics of Death: Indigenous Struggle and Indigenous Policy in Brazil (1980–2020)¹

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[...] we must put an end to all that causes suffering,
that kills, that destroys life.
[...] we don't even have to build anything new,
the indigenous people already have a project,
the riverside communities already have a project,
we just have to stop, look, reflect and act.

ANTONIA MELO²

On 9 April 2020, Alvanei Xirixana, a fifteen-year-old Yanomami, died of Covid-19 at the General Hospital of Roraima. He was the first indigenous victim of the pandemic to be officially recorded. The Yanomami people, who live on the border between Brazil and Venezuela, have survived major epidemics, the most recent of which only fell short of wiping out the entire population because their land was demarcated in 1992, momentarily stemming invasions by gold miners, the main cause of contagion.³ The youth's death comprises elements that will provide the starting points for our reflection here.

The Yanomami land is inhabited by 27,000 indigenous people,⁴ and is

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² Available at <<http://revistadr.com.br/posts/antonia-melo-lideranca-do-movimento-xingu-vivo-para-sempre/>> [accessed 8 May 2020].

³ The demarcation of indigenous lands is a long administrative process that involves several technical and bureaucratic steps, under the responsibility of the indigenous agency (FUNAI): 1) identification of the land through a detailed study carried out by technical staff; 2) approval of the detailed report by FUNAI; 3) time-limit for challenges; 4) declaration of the area's limits; 5) physical demarcation; 6) ratification by the President of the Republic; 7) registration with the relevant notary and the Office of Federal Property (SPU). Available at <<https://pib.socioambiental.org/pt/Demarcações>> [accessed 23 April 2020].

⁴ Available at <<https://pib.socioambiental.org/pt/Povo:Yanomami>> [accessed 8 May 2020].

currently invaded by about 25,000 gold miners.⁵ Illegal small-scale mining in indigenous lands is an unhealthy activity with intensive use of techniques and substances that are harmful to the environment, causing silting up of rivers and polluting them with mercury and other chemicals.⁶ In addition, the incessant movement of labour introduces diseases and alcoholism, while favouring activities such as prostitution and drug trafficking.

Alvanei took more than twenty days to be diagnosed, dying a few days after being tested.⁷ Similar situations of neglect have been common for decades. The ethnocide recipe is complete: epidemics, land-grabbing, exploitation and degradation of natural resources, undermining of rights, faulty or non-existent public policies, religious conversion.⁸ Our purpose here is to retrace a recent historical and political process in which elements of this recipe are renewed while highlighting the existence of a confrontation in which the indigenous struggle emerges as a significant political force.

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Analysing this process in the twenty-first century requires looking back to include the transition period between the civil-military dictatorship and the restoration of democracy in Brazil (1980–90). In the last three decades three periods, in turn, stand out in relation to indigenous rights and indigenous policy. The first occurred in the wake of the enactment of the 1988 Constitution (CF-88), when the current indigenous legislation was designed and started bearing fruit (1990–2006). In the second, the government's economic and political choices opened up the field of indigenous rights to negotiation, exposing them to multiple attacks and attempts at undermining (2006–18). And the third is marked by the dismantling of democratic advances, with the election of Jair Bolsonaro installing a process of radicalization and an openly genocidal policy.

⁵ Bruce Albert, *Agora somos todos índios*, Coleção Pandemia (São Paulo: N-1, 2020).

⁶ Luiz César Marques Filho, *Capitalismo e colapso ambiental* (Campinas, SP: Editora da Unicamp, 2018), p. 230.

⁷ Albert, *Agora somos todos índios*.

⁸ Ethnocide is used here in a sense widely employed in anthropology, meaning the extermination of difference (or sociocultural distinctiveness) for the purposes of its assimilation into a dominant sociocultural context. In the case of Brazilian indigenous peoples, it occurs through these multiple actions. For a broader discussion of this notion of ethnocide, associated with the concept of genocide and applied to indigenous peoples in Brazil, see Orlando Calheiros, '“No Tempo da Guerra”: algumas notas sobre as violações dos direitos dos povos indígenas e os limites da justiça de transição no Brasil', *Re-vista Verdade, Memória e Justiça*, 9 (2015), and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, 'Sobre a noção de etnocídio com especial atenção ao caso brasileiro' (mimeograph, undated).

The Virtuous Cycle

The flocking of indigenous people for rights

In 1978, the civil-military dictatorship tried to issue a decree for the emancipation of indigenous peoples, seeking to end the tutelage regime introduced in the early twentieth century. This regime was based on the Indian Statute (Law 6001/1973), guided by the Civil Code of 1916, whereby indigenous people, married women and children over 16 but under 21 were considered to be 'relatively capable' of managing their own lives.⁹ That meant that indigenous people were deemed either 'primitive', living according to their own customs and traditions, or 'acculturated', and therefore destined for emancipation, with the consequent dissolution of their differences.¹⁰

The attempt at emancipation led to the uniting of militant forces and culminated in the founding of the Union of Indigenous Nations (UNI), the first Brazilian national indigenous movement.¹¹ UNI was born from the recommendations of the 1st Indigenous Studies Seminar of Mato Grosso do Sul, held in Campo Grande in 1980. This gathering brought together representatives of fifteen indigenous peoples, including Mário Juruna, who would become the first indigenous federal deputy,¹² and was attended by anthropologists such as Darcy Ribeiro and Carmen Junqueira.¹³

The momentous occasion was marked by strong regional and national mobilization, with alliances driven by the conjuncture, as described by Ailton Krenak:

The coordination of this thing they call indigenous movement was like a flock of birds [...] that come together in flight and then break up. [...] People ask what so many different people who met on that occasion, different indigenous ethnicities, riverside dwellers, rubber tappers, might have in common. What they had in common was fear of progress!¹⁴

⁹ Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, 'Índios na Constituição', *Novos Estudos Cebrap*, São Paulo, 3,3 (2018), 429–43 (pp. 430–31).

¹⁰ Manuela Carneiro da Cunha 'Compartilhar a memória', in *Os Índios na Constituição*, ed. by Camila L. Dias and Artionka Capiberibe (São Paulo: Ateliê Editorial, 2019); Ailton Krenak, *Ailton Krenak: encontros* (Rio de Janeiro: Azougue, 2015); Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, 'No Brasil todo mundo é índio exceto quem não é', in *Povos Indígenas no Brasil 2001/2005*, ed. by C. A. Ricardo and F. Ricardo (São Paulo: Instituto Socioambiental, 2006), pp. 41–54.

¹¹ This movement partly resulted from the large assemblies coordinated by the Indigenous Missionary Council (CIMI) from the 1970s onwards. CIMI, which works uncompromisingly for the defence of indigenous rights, was created in 1972 following the Second Vatican Council, when the Catholic Church engaged in a process of self-criticism of its missionary practices. See Marcos P. Rufino, 'O código da cultura: o CIMI no debate da inculturação', in *Deus na aldeia: missionários, índios e mediação cultural*, ed. by P. Montero (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Globo, 2006), pp. 235–75.

¹² Mário Juruna was elected federal deputy for Rio de Janeiro in 1982. Only in 2018 would another indigenous person take a seat in Congress, when Joênia Wapichana was elected for Roraima.

¹³ Sidiclei R. de Deparis, 'União das Nações Indígenas (UNI): contribuição ao movimento indígena no Brasil (1980–1988)' (unpublished Master's thesis, UFGD, 2007), pp. 81–90.

¹⁴ Ailton Krenak, *Ideias para adiar o fim do mundo* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2019), p. 220.

This seminal political coordination marked the memory of those involved in it, such as the Yanomami shaman Davi Kopenawa:

The first time I spoke about the forest away from home was at an assembly in the city of Manaus. However, I didn't speak to whites, but to an indigenous audience! It was the time when the gold miners were beginning to invade our lands [...]. So Ailton Krenak and Álvaro Tukano, leaders of the Union of Indigenous Nations, invited me to speak. They said: 'You must defend your people's forest with us! We need to speak out together against those who want to take over our lands! Otherwise we will all end up disappearing, like our ancestors before us!'¹⁵

The mobilization coordinated, alongside an expanded network of non-indigenous allies, the drafting of the 'Indians' chapter of CF-88, composed of Articles 231 and 232. Article 231 introduces three key changes related to indigenous rights: it establishes the right to land as original, recognizing its pre-existence in relation to the institution of the Brazilian state, as explained by José Afonso da Silva;¹⁶ it creates the concept of 'Indigenous Land' (TI), which goes beyond a mere notion of territory,¹⁷ including, as Capiberibe stresses, the human and non-human lives that comprise indigenous socio-cosmologies, in an explicit recognition of the right to difference;¹⁸ lastly, it is a powerful legal and political tool, making it incumbent upon the federal government to demarcate and protect indigenous lands.¹⁹

In 1997, Bruce Albert drew attention to the way in which Article 232 changed the political game,²⁰ legitimizing indigenous action by bypassing the issue of tutelage,²¹ and assigning to the Public Prosecution Service the institutional responsibility to act in defence of indigenous rights. As Viveiros de Castro points out, CF-88 enshrines 'the principle that indigenous communities are collective subjects with collective rights. The "Indian" gave way to the "community" and thus the individual gave way to the relational and the transindividual [...]'.²² The destiny of indigenous peoples would no longer be assimilation and 'de-indianization', but self-determination: 'The indigenous peoples gradually

¹⁵ Davi Kopenawa and Bruce Albert, *A queda do céu: palavras de um xamã yanomami* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2015), p. 385.

¹⁶ José Afonso da Silva, 'Parecer', in *Direitos dos povos indígenas em disputa*, ed. by M. Carneiro da Cunha and S. Rodrigues Barbosa (São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2018), pp. 17–42 (pp. 20–21).

¹⁷ Carneiro da Cunha, 'Compartilhar a memória' p. 45.

¹⁸ Artionka Capiberibe, 'Dos índios: em defesa da Constituição', *Publicação Oficial da Associação Juízes para a Democracia*, ano 18, nº 78 (2018), 3–5 (p. 4); available at <<https://ajd.org.br/jornal-78/>> [accessed 21 April 2020].

¹⁹ *Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil: promulgada em 5 de outubro de 1988*; available at <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Constituicao/Constituicao.htm> [accessed 21 April 2020].

²⁰ Bruce Albert, 'Territorialité, ethno-développement et développement: à propos du mouvement indien en Amazonie brésilienne', *Cahier de l'Amérique Latine*, 23 (1997), 177–210 (p. 188).

²¹ The issue of tutelage is involved in constant legal disputes, as it continues being invoked to neutralize indigenous political and legal actions; see Luiz H. Eloy Terena, 'A Constituição em disputa', in *Os Índios na Constituição*, ed. by C. Loureiro Dias and Artionka Capiberibe (São Paulo: Ateliê Editorial, 2019), pp. 103–16 (p. 110).

²² Viveiros de Castro, 'Sobre a noção de etnocídio', p. 14.

started demanding and eventually obtained the constitutional recognition of a permanent differentiated status within the so-called “national communion”.²³ The consequences of those achievements would be felt in the following decade.

The ‘Time of Demarcation’

The period 1990–2000 can be considered a virtuous cycle of access to the constitutionally guaranteed right to demarcation. An exemplary case is the ratification of the Yanomami Indigenous Land, driven by the work of indigenous organizations and international pressure related to environmental issues, a prominent theme at Rio 1992 (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development). Over this period, the indigenous movement achieved international recognition thanks to emblematic personalities whose speeches related indigenous and ecological issues, granting demarcation a political dimension that went beyond Brazilian borders.²⁴

Going back to the Yanomami land, at the height of the civil-military dictatorship in the 1970s, when the Amazon region became the target of development and settlement policies under the National Integration Plan (PIN),²⁵ work was started on the North Perimeter Highway (BR-210), conceived to follow the entire borderline from Colombia to the state of Amapá, affecting lands inhabited by the Yanomami at one end and the Wajãpi at the other (see Map 1). Regarding the latter, Gallois reports:

As a result of the contact between indigenous people and gold miners, nineteen natives died of measles in Karapanaty in 1972. There was also gold mining in the region of the Água-Preta stream between 1969 and 1970, causing the death of more than ten natives from a flu epidemic; the remaining inhabitants of that area were wiped out soon afterwards by another epidemic, *with only two survivors remaining in 1973*.²⁶

Shortly afterwards, the RADAM project²⁷ published a survey of the region’s important mineral potential, setting off what Kopenawa and Albert described as ‘one of the most spectacular twentieth-century’ gold rushes. Between 1985 and 1990, around one hundred clandestine airstrips were opened and 30,000 to 40,000 illegal gold miners moved into Yanomami lands, causing ‘an


²³ Viveiros de Castro, ‘No Brasil todo mundo é índio’, p. 43.

²⁴ Highlights include the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples (Kari-Oca), a parallel event to Rio 92; the initiatives of the indigenous leader Raoni Metuktire with the singer Sting for the demarcation of the Kayapó land (from 1988) and against the Kararaô hydro power project in Pará (1989, see below); and the engagement of prominent figures of Brazilian show business, such as Milton Nascimento, who released the album *Txai* (1990). The indigenous efforts were also recognized through awards, such as the UN Global 500 Roll of Honor, granted to Paulinho Payakan (1990) and Davi Kopenawa (1991).

²⁵ PIN was implemented with the goal of occupying ‘empty’ spaces in Brazil, developing in them infrastructure works and land settlement programmes, and settling labour in the Amazon region.

²⁶ Dominique Gallois, ‘Cap. Waiãpi — 3/Amapá, Norte do Pará’, in *Povos Indígenas no Brasil*, ed. by Carlos Alberto Ricardo (São Paulo: CEDI, 1983), pp. 98–137 (p. 111, emphasis added).

²⁷ A project created in 1970 for radar mapping of natural resources in the Amazon region and, later, in Brazil as a whole.



MAP 1. North Perimeter Highway [design: Diogo C. dos Santos].

unprecedented epidemiological shock among the Yanomami'.²⁸ Evangelical missions complemented this setting.²⁹ The demarcation of their land was vital for the Yanomami, ensuring them a certain degree of temporary security.

The land demarcations of this virtuous cycle enabled a demographic recovery of indigenous peoples, due also to improvements in access to healthcare services and the inclusion of self-declaration in the population census. Thus, the indigenous population increased from 306,245 people in 1991 to 817,963 in 2010.³⁰ In addition, the responsibilities of the indigenous agency, the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), started being redefined in this period, planning the decentralization of public policies for indigenous peoples in view of the issue of their self-determination.³¹

²⁸ Kopenawa and Albert, *A queda do céu*, pp. 561–62.

²⁹ The main strategy of these missions for penetrating indigenous communities is to offer basic services, especially healthcare and education, where the state is absent. These evangelical missions, known as cross-cultural missions, are the majority among indigenous peoples today. Proselytizing and guided by fundamentalist principles, they differ radically from post-Second Vatican Council (1965) Catholic missions such as CIMI and historical Protestants. See Ronaldo Almeida, 'Tradução e mediação: missões transculturais entre grupos indígenas', in *Deus na aldeia: missionários, índios e mediação cultural*, ed. by Paula Montero (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Globo, 2006), pp. 277–304 (pp. 279–84).

³⁰ These figures are analysed in <https://pib.socioambiental.org/pt/O_Censo_2010_e_os_Povos_Ind%C3%ADgenas> [accessed 3 June 2020].

³¹ Henry T. Barretto Filho and Adriana Ramos, 'Da luta por direitos à luta para não perdê-los: povos e terras indígenas (TIs) na guerra pela destinação de terras públicas no Brasil pós-Constituição', in *As políticas da política: desigualdades e inclusão nos governos do PSDB e do PT*, ed. by Marta Arretche, Eduardo Marques and Carlos Aurélio Pimenta de Faria (São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2019), p. 331.

The 'Time of Projects'

The recognition of self-determination (Article 232, CF-88) led to the creation of multiple local and regional indigenous associations, helped by supporting organizations and benefiting from a government strategy to strengthen the third sector between the 1990s and 2003. One must bear in mind that this was a period marked worldwide by a policy of funding local actors that tended to reduce the state's role in promoting social well-being.³²

Regarding indigenous peoples in Brazil, on the one hand this trend produced a harnessing of the idea of diversity-based development,³³ favouring the accommodation of the collectives and their organizations and demands to the global neoliberal agenda endorsed by multilateral agencies. The situation is similar to that described by Silvia Federici about the domestication of the feminist movement in the 1980s and 1990s by UN programs for the promotion of 'women's rights'. Under the pretext of 'emancipation' this process would undermine the autonomy of local feminist movements and depoliticize feminism 'by adapting it to the goals of global capital and the institutions that support it'.³⁴ Similarly, in the indigenous movement, but in the name of 'sustainable development', many associations began to focus on funding and projects (in partnership with NGOs), opening a period marked by a certain fragmentation of the indigenous movement. On the other hand, as shown by Albert³⁵ and Barretto Filho and Ramos,³⁶ this process fostered another kind of political participation, more technical and bureaucratic, which would enable indigenous action both inside and outside the state.

The 2000s also witnessed the redesigning of the public policy model influenced by the institution of legal changes related to indigenous peoples, at national and international level. Prominent among such changes were the ILO Convention 169 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).³⁷

In 1999 the federal government transferred the administration of indigenous health resources from FUNAI to the National Health Foundation (Funasa),³⁸

³² According to Albert, in 1991 there were 48 indigenous organizations, increasing to 109 by 1996 ('Territorialité, ethno-développement et développement', p. 189). Pacheco de Oliveira adds the 1999 data, totalling 290 organizations: 'Regime tutelar e globalização: um exercício de sociogênese dos atuais movimentos indígenas no Brasil', in *O nascimento do Brasil e outros ensaios: 'pacificação', regime tutelar e formação de alteridades* (Rio de Janeiro: Contra Capa, 2016), pp. 265–88 (p. 281).

³³ Oliveira, p. 299.

³⁴ Silvia Federici, *O ponto zero da Revolução: trabalho doméstico, reprodução e luta feminista*, trans. by Coletivo Sycorax (São Paulo: Editora Elefante, 2019), p. 238.

³⁵ Bruce Albert, 'Associações indígenas e desenvolvimento sustentável na Amazônia brasileira', in *Povos Indígenas no Brasil, 1996–2000*, ed. by Carlos Alberto Ricardo (São Paulo: Instituto Socioambiental, 2000), pp. 197–203 (pp. 198, 201).

³⁶ Barretto Filho and Ramos, 'Da luta por direitos à luta para não perdê-los', p. 323.

³⁷ Christian Ramos and Laís Abramo, 'Introdução', in *Convenção 169 sobre povos indígenas e tribais e Resolução referente à ação da OIT/Organização Internacional do Trabalho* (Brasília: OIT, 2011).

³⁸ Government body responsible for providing basic sanitation and designed to assist the implementation of SUS (Unified Health System). SUS was created by Article 196 of CF-88 and

creating thirty-four indigenous healthcare districts across the country. Thus, through agreements, local indigenous associations started playing a major role in resource management alongside local governments and civil society organizations. Decentralization brought about some improvement in healthcare delivery, but in 2004 Funasa re-centralized resource management, ending the partnership with organizations (indigenous and non-indigenous). This aggravated the already precarious financial situation of the partner institutions, which started to be defamed and 'suffer administrative interventions', in some cases having their assets seized, causing many to close down, besides damaging their image.³⁹

In a similar process, acknowledgment of the specificity of indigenous education by CF-88 (Article 210, paragraph 2) led to the development of a model of public indigenous education. So far, education had been in the charge of FUNAI under rather improvised conditions, often delegated to missionary agencies.⁴⁰ In 1991, school education was transferred from FUNAI to the Ministry of Education and, in 1999, guidelines for 'indigenous schooling' were created, recognizing its specific status and transferring the responsibility for its provision to state and local governments.⁴¹

As stressed by Ailton Krenak, in many cases this paradigm shift from assimilationist education to an education that respects differences is not yet a reality in indigenous schooling.⁴² But the movement has had important political effects, particularly in the last fifteen years. One of them related to the training of teachers, who started to play a role that went beyond schooling, either as actual leaders or by developing new leaders. In turn, this schooling system educated a critical mass of female and male students willing to claim space in the country's universities, besides affording greater visibility to the field of indigenous literatures and philosophies.⁴³

implemented in 1990, following a model of universal health care (see Ana Paula do Rego Menezes, Bruno Moretti and Ademar Arthur Chioro dos Reis, 'O Futuro do SUS: impactos das reformas neoliberais na saúde pública: austeridade versus universalidade', *Saúde e Debate*, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 43, n. Especial 5 (2019), 58–70).

³⁹ Luiza Garnelo, 'Cap. 1. Política de Saúde Indígena no Brasil: notas sobre as tendências atuais do processo de implantação do subsistema de atenção à saúde', *Saúde Indígena: uma introdução ao tema*, ed. by Luiza Garnelo and Ana Lucia Pontes (Brasília: Secadi/UNESCO and Projeto Trilhas de Conhecimentos — LACED/Museu Nacional, 2012), pp. 18–58 (p. 48).

⁴⁰ Gersem dos Santos Luciano Baniwa, *O índio brasileiro: o que você precisa saber sobre os povos indígenas no Brasil de hoje* (Brasília: Ministério da Educação, Secretaria de Educação Continuada, Alfabetização e Diversidade; LACED/Museu Nacional, 2006), pp. 167–69; Luís Donisete Benzi Grupioni, 'A educação escolar indígena no Brasil: a passos lentos', in *Povos Indígenas no Brasil, 1996/2000*, ed. by Carlos Alberto Ricardo (São Paulo: Instituto Socioambiental, 2000), pp. 143–47 (p. 143).

⁴¹ Aracy Lopes da Silva, 'A educação indígena entre diálogos interculturais e multidisciplinares: introdução', in *Antropologia, história e educação*, ed. by Aracy Lopes da Silva and Mariana Kawall Leal Ferreira (São Paulo: Global: 2001), pp. 9–25 (p. 10); Grupioni, pp. 146–47.

⁴² Krenak, *Encontros*, pp. 248–50.

⁴³ Especially prominent authors and thinkers like Daniel Munduruku, Eliane Potiguara, Cristino Wapichana, Davi Kopenawa and Ailton Krenak. More recently, a relevant indigenous artistic movement has emerged, both in visual arts with Denilson Baniwa, Jaider Esbell, Taniki and Joseca Yanomami,

From 1996, through the Integrated Project for the Protection of Indigenous Populations and Lands in the Legal Amazon (PPTAL/PPG7), international funding was provided for demarcation, especially in the Amazon region. The funding agencies encouraged ‘participatory’ demarcation, stimulating agreements with indigenous organizations, supporting institutions and universities.⁴⁴

In the same period, indigenous peoples living in the country’s earliest settlement regions, such as the Northeast, South, Southeast and Mato Grosso do Sul, did not benefit equally from funding, which created a gap in land demarcation and recognition of rights.⁴⁵ That contributed to an intensification of land conflicts in these regions, driving an indigenous struggle that came to be known by the term *retomada* [retaking], originally used to describe the Guarani and Kaiowá movement to recover their lands.⁴⁶ Besides exposing social and land inequalities, the drive to retake indigenous lands shows that, from an indigenous point of view, this was not a dispute over property and land use conceived as a commodity. ‘Retaking’ is the struggle for a way of life as a whole, which cannot be conceived outside the web of relationships woven between humans and non-humans in an inhabited space/place.⁴⁷ Retaking the land is reconnecting with the network of relationships that compose it. This is markedly personified in the cases of the Tupinambá in Bahia and the Guarani and Kaiowá in Mato Grosso do Sul,⁴⁸ and expressively stated by a prominent Kaiowá leader:

These big woods have always been ours [...]. They [the whites] cut down all the woods to then name the place Mato Grosso do Sul [Southern Thick Woods]. So they hid from us our medicines, our meat, our game, which was the armadillo, the agouti, the tapir, the lizard: those animals were all ours. They spread them all away from us, the owners of the animals raised [to the sky] all of them. So *our food today is made by machines*.⁴⁹

Mana and Kitxi Huni Kui, Feliciano Lana (a Desana artist, who died in May 2020 from Covid-19); and in film, with names like Ariel Ortega, Patrícia Ferreira, Alberto Álvares, Takumã Kuikuro, among others, plus the productions of indigenous collectives such as the Cultural Association of Indigenous Filmmakers (ASCURI).

⁴⁴ Cf. PPTAL guidelines, available at <<https://acervo.socioambiental.org/acervo/documentos/pptal-projeto-integrado-de-protecao-populacoes-e-terras-indigenas-da-amazonia>> [accessed 1 May 2020].

⁴⁵ Oliveira, pp. 299–300; Barretto Filho and Ramos, ‘Da luta por direitos à luta para não perdê-los’, p. 330.

⁴⁶ The retaking of land by the Guarani and Kaiowá begins in 1979 with the reoccupation of lands on the Rancho Jacaré and Guaimbé farms, in Mato Grosso do Sul (see Meire Adriana da Silva, ‘O Movimento dos Guarani e Kaiowá de reocupação e recuperação de seus territórios em Mato Grosso do Sul e a participação do CIMI (Conselho Indigenista Missionário) — 1978–2001’ (unpublished Master’s dissertation, Universidade Federal do Mato Grosso do Sul (UFMS), 2005), pp. 122–37).

⁴⁷ Susana de Matos Viegas, *Terra Calada: Os Tupinambá na Mata Atlântica do Sul da Bahia* (Rio de Janeiro: 7Letras, 2007), pp. 270–72.

⁴⁸ Daniela Alarcon, *O retorno da terra: as retomadas na aldeia tupinambá da Serra do Padeiro, Sul da Bahia* (São Paulo: Elefante, 2019); Spensy M. Pimentel, *Elementos para uma teoria política kaiowá e guarani* (unpublished doctoral thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, 2012); Viegas, *Terra Calada*.

⁴⁹ Atanásio apud Pimentel, p. 205.

The situation in these regions increasingly exposed the unequal and violent conflict over the concept of land, its enjoyment and use. It also foreshadowed what, from 2007, would become an open war between those who struggled to ensure indigenous rights and the economic development project led by a government which, for pragmatic political reasons, forged an alliance with anti-indigenous sectors (known in Congress as the 'Beef, Bullet and Bible' block for its lobby in favour of agribusiness, the arms industry and evangelical churches). Thus, after a brief period of political and legal advances, indigenous peoples were once again facing a biased state that neglected policies for the recognition of differences, defied constitutional provisions, and privileged the hegemonic sectors of the economy. The attacks were multiple in all three branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial) and unleashed on two fronts: on the one hand in the legal sphere and, on the other, through the execution of public policies, guided by an economic development project founded on the extensive exploitation of natural and human resources,⁵⁰ and, at the same time, on a notion of social inclusion based on redistribution of income to encourage consumption.⁵¹

The Dark Times

One of the most significant processes in the interplay of interests surrounding indigenous lands, for its impact and multiple meanings, occurred over three of the four terms of the Workers' Party (PT, 2002–16), namely that of the Raposa Serra do Sol land in Roraima. This case would trigger the rebirth of a national pan-indigenous movement that took shape in an increasingly hostile context. It should be noted that there was a severe and progressive reduction in the demarcation of indigenous lands in this period,⁵² as noted by Barretto Filho and Ramos.⁵³ From that moment the indigenous movement started struggling to preserve its rights.

In 2004, in the context of the struggle for the Raposa Serra do Sol TI, the 1st Free Land Camp (ATL) was organized in Brasília, attended by twenty-one indigenous peoples, with the goal of pressuring President Lula to ratify that land.⁵⁴ In 2005, ATL sparked the creation of the Coordination of

⁵⁰ Artionka Capiberibe and Oiara Bonilla, 'A ocupação do Congresso: contra o quê lutam os índios?', *Estudos Avançados*, 29.83 (2015), 293–313.

⁵¹ The government implemented the *Bolsa Família* social welfare program, including for indigenous peoples, privileging such policies over land demarcation. See Ricardo Verdum, *Estudos Etnográficos sobre o Programa Bolsa Família em Povos Indígenas (Relatório Final)* (Brasília: SAGI/MDS, 2016).

⁵² In the two presidential terms of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 145 Indigenous Lands (TIs) were ratified (114 in 1994–98 and 31 in 1998–2002); in the two terms of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 81 TIs were ratified (66 in 2002–06 and 21 in 2006–10); in Dilma Rousseff's two terms, 21 TIs were ratified (11 in 2010–14 and 10 in 2014–16); however, no lands were ratified in the Temer and Bolsonaro administrations. Data available at <https://pib.socioambiental.org/pt/Situação_jurídica_das_TIs_no_Brasil_hoje> [accessed 21 May 2020]. See note 3 above.

⁵³ Barretto Filho and Ramos, 'Da luta por direitos à luta para não perdê-los'.

⁵⁴ Gilberto Vieira dos Santos, 'O movimento indígena contemporâneo no contexto dos conflitos no campo', *Revista Terra Livre*, São Paulo, Ano 34, 1.52 (2019), 323–59 (p. 339).

Indigenous Peoples of Brazil (APIB) and was thenceforth held every year. APIB was constituted as an alliance of regional organizations,⁵⁵ becoming the main political agent and representative of indigenous demands. One of its achievements in public policy was the creation in 2011 of the Special Office for Indigenous Health (SESAI).⁵⁶

In a 2015 article,⁵⁷ we drew attention to the large number of legal initiatives aiming to further degrade the living conditions of indigenous populations, among them the Proposed Constitutional Amendment (PEC) 215/2000, whose objective was to transfer the approval of the indigenous and *quilombola* lands, as well as of the Environmental Conservation Units, from the executive to the legislature, a proposal formulated by the Agricultural Parliamentary Front (the first B of the ‘Beef, Bullet and Bible’ block) in order to frustrate demarcation processes.

Such was the case of the demarcation process of the Raposa Serra do Sol Indigenous Land, which, due to the obstacles imposed by miners, cattle breeders and rice farmers, took more than three decades to be concluded. The dispute partially ended only in 2009, after several violent conflicts and a drawn-out legal battle waged in the Federal Supreme Court (STF). But the partial victory came at a price, as the STF, to guarantee the continuous demarcation of the territory, imposed nineteen conditions, many of them representing a loss of rights, such as legalizing the introduction of military bases, roads, hydro power plants and mining activities in indigenous lands without consulting their communities. Some of these conditions cater to demands by the armed forces in the so-called ‘interest of national defence policy’, while opening up possibilities for economic exploitation that override the indigenous peoples’ original rights.

These conditions unfolded into other legal proposals, one of the most recent being Opinion 001/2017 of the General Counsel for the Federal Government (AGU). This Opinion institutes the adoption of the nineteen conditions for Raposa Serra do Sol and includes the so-called ‘time reference’. Thus, one witnesses the project to dismantle indigenous rights being expanded by the incorporation of new legal instruments. The *marco temporal* [time reference], which is not provided in the Constitution, is a legal invention aiming to establish the date of the promulgation of CF-88 (10 May 1988) as a time reference point for land claims. The fallacious argument intended to support this thesis is explained by the indigenous lawyer Luiz Eloy Terena:

⁵⁵ The following are members of APIB: Coordination of Indigenous Peoples of the Northeast Region, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo (APOINME), Council of the Terena People, Coordination of Indigenous Peoples of the Southeast Region (ARPINSUDESTE), Coordination of Indigenous Peoples of the South Region (ARPINSUL), Great Assembly of the Guarani People (ATY GUASU), Coordination of Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon Region (COIAB) and Guarani Yvyrupa Committee. Available at <<http://apib.info/apib/>> [accessed 6 May 2020].

⁵⁶ Garnelo, ‘Política de Saúde Indígena no Brasil’, p. 25.

⁵⁷ Oiara Bonilla and Artionka Capiberibe, ‘Isolados ou cadastrados: os índios na era desenvolvimentista’, *Revista DR*, 1 (2015), available online at <<http://revistadr.com.br/posts/isolados-ou-cadastrados-os-indios-na-era-desenvolvimentista/>> [accessed 26 June 2020].

They say the following: 'Your Honour, the Constitution indeed recognized the original rights of indigenous peoples, but the Constitution used the verb in the present tense: "occupy"'. Then they point out, underline that word: 'occupy'. And they continue: 'Your Honour, the verb was in the present tense and it means that the Constitution recognized only the lands they were occupied at the exact moment the text was promulgated'. [And he concludes] [...] The grammatical interpretation of the law is the weakest interpretation in the legal world.⁵⁸

The 'Time of Tides'

While this tsunami of legal setbacks was being set in motion, the federal government was encroaching on indigenous lands with its economic development project, notably from the PAC (*Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento* [Growth Acceleration Program]) launched in 2007 by President Lula, which included a number of major infrastructure works. The Belo Monte hydro power plant (HPP), on the Xingu River, was the most important PAC construction site and, despite opposition by social organizations, construction was initiated in 2011 and the first turbine became operational in 2016.⁵⁹

As shown in the thesis by Sabrina Nascimento, Belo Monte is a perfect example of what, due to the recurrence of events, constitutes an 'accomplished fact'.⁶⁰ As of CF-88, a set of rules governed the performance of public administration regarding the implementation of works and business ventures, among them environmental licensing and impact studies,⁶¹ public hearings, and consultation with affected populations. However, Belo Monte will overrule these legal precepts in the name of the country's energy security. The planning of the hydro power plant overrides legislation, prevailing over it and, in time, becoming an 'accomplished fact'. What was illegal becomes legal and irreversible.⁶²

⁵⁸ Terena, 'A Constituição em disputa', p. 108.

⁵⁹ Belo Monte is a project first conceived by the military government (1970s) with the name of Kararaô which was repeatedly postponed due to pressure from local communities. The struggle against this project culminated in the 1st Meeting of the Indigenous Peoples of the Xingu, in Altamira in 1989, which brought together hundreds of leaders from the region, including Raoni Metuktire, Megaron Txucarramãe and Paulinho Paiakan (A. Oswaldo Sevá, 'Profanação hidrelétrica de Btyre/Xingu: fios condutores e armadilhas (até setembro de 2012)', in *Belo Monte e a questão indígena*, ed. by João Pacheco de Oliveira and Clarice Cohn (Brasília, DF: ABA, 2014), pp. 170–205 (p. 181). The group met for a second time in Altamira in 2008, and in 2011 held an occupation of the construction site attended by more than 400 indigenous people, fishermen and riverside dwellers who were removed in a military operation carried out by government forces. The struggle continues to this day.

⁶⁰ Sabrina Nascimento, 'Violência e estado de exceção na Amazônia brasileira: um estudo sobre a implantação da hidrelétrica de Belo Monte no Rio Xingu (PA)' (unpublished doctoral thesis, Núcleo de Altos Estudos Amazônicos, Belém; Universidade Federal do Pará, 2017), p. 212.

⁶¹ The Environmental Impact Study (EIA) and the Environmental Impact Report (RIMA) are two documents of equivalent value, key to the environmental licensing processes of works and projects.

⁶² In this process, a war of legal procedures was set in motion in which the local populations also made use of their bodies, as in the occupation of the construction site. For more on the idea of the body as a political weapon, see Artionka Capiberibe, 'Um interminável Brasil colônia: os povos indígenas e um outro desenvolvimento', *Maloca: Revista de Estudos Indígenas*, 1.1 (2018), 53–77.

The Juruna people (Yudjá people) of the Paquiçamba TI, who, together with the Arara people, are directly impacted by the Belo Monte HPP, denounce one of its disastrous effects, the so-called *consenso hidrográfico* [consensus hydrograph]. After the river was dammed, the rate of flow (of the rainy and dry seasons) was changed, affecting the course of the Xingu River at the point of the so-called *Volta Grande* [Big Bend].⁶³ Nowadays, the discharge no longer floods the surrounding vegetation, and its seasonal alternation is controlled artificially by the dam company, guided by its own interests in producing energy. This affects the flora and fauna, directly upsetting fishing activities and the Juruna people's livelihood.⁶⁴ The landscape has changed and the river has become a dangerous place, especially near the reservoir, where large waves are thrown up, posing risks to boats. One local resident stated:

I cry when I see the 'sarobas' [riverside plants] dying on one side of the dam, the thin, half- dead turtles. [...] That makes me so scared, I'm scared of dying there in that huge lake, of dying like the trees died. *The river is now controlled by machines*. We are now living the time of tides. The Xingu River is messed up. The fish are lost and so are we.⁶⁵

To make up for the loss of navigability in the river, a road was opened connecting the TI to the city of Altamira, creating a pathway to deforestation and land grabbing.⁶⁶ In 2018 there was an exponential increase in deforested areas around and inside the region's indigenous lands, from three hectares in May to 5000 hectares in November of the same year.⁶⁷ Besides the reduced discharge and deviation of the Xingu River, which has practically destroyed the Juruna's livelihood, the competent bodies have not regulated the demarcation of their land or cleared it of invaders, as provided for in the conditions for the construction of Belo Monte.⁶⁸

Fifteen kilometres from the dam, impacting the same region, the Canadian company Belo Sun Mining has opened Volta Grande Gold Project, the largest open-cast gold mine in Brazil. What draws attention in the Environmental Impact Report of this project is the prospect of using electricity produced at Belo Monte. This corroborates the accusations that the power plant, which operates to its full capacity only four months a year due to the hydrological peculiarities of the Xingu River, will benefit industries rather than the population, and more precisely the so-called electro-intensive enterprises.

⁶³ Close to the city of Altamira, the Xingu River has a sharp bend which forms canals, rapids and islands that today are 'dry'. Its discharge has been restricted upstream by the Pimental dam and diverted to feed the Belo Monte reservoir. See Map 2.


⁶⁴ Juárez Pezzuti, Cristiane Carneiro, Thais Mantovanelli and Biviany Rojas Garzón, *Xingu, o rio que pulsa em nós: monitoramento independente para registro de impactos da UHE Belo Monte no território e no modo de vida do povo Juruna (Yudjá) da Volta Grande do Xingu* (São Paulo: ISA, 2018), p. 31.

⁶⁵ Dona Graça apud Pezzuti et al., p. 15, emphasis added.

⁶⁶ The term in Portuguese is *grilagem*, meaning illegal appropriation of public lands.

⁶⁷ Available at <<https://www.socioambiental.org/pt-br/blog/blog-do-xingu/grandes-empresendimentos-provocam-boom-de-desmatamento-na-volta-grande-do-xingu>> [accessed 15 May 2020].

⁶⁸ Nascimento, 'Violência e estado de exceção na Amazônia brasileira', pp. 219–20; 224; 285.



MAP 2. Belo Sun Mining [design: Diogo C. dos Santos]

The effects of Belo Sun magnify those related to small-scale mining mentioned earlier. Not far from there, the Xikrin people of the Cateté River are experiencing at first hand the consequences of this type of mining. The report by the physician Vieira Filho (2020) indicates the presence of heavy metals in alarming and extremely toxic levels in local rivers close to the Onça Puma Project of the mining company Vale do Rio Doce. Added to the resulting environmental degradation is the spread of chronic degenerative diseases that genetically affect the present and future of the Xikrin:

The Xikrin are consuming manioc, cassava, sweet potato, softening those root vegetables in the Cateté and Itacaiúnas rivers, with high levels of lead and cadmium, metals which have terrible consequences for the brain, kidneys, bones and other vital organs. The accumulation of these heavy metals in the body has been corroborated by scientific papers on DNA methylation, with alteration of gene expression transmitted across generations or to future generations by those who do not die.⁶⁹

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This ‘Time of Tides’ inaugurated a period that would engulf indigenous peoples in a politics of death focused on the destruction of the legal framework

⁶⁹ João Paulo B. Vieira Filho, ‘A metilação do DNA (código genético) hereditária podendo promover doenças crônico-degenerativas para as gerações de índios Xikrin atuais e futuras, que pode ser ocasionada pelos metais pesados ou elementos químicos lançados no Rio Cateté pela Usina Onça-Puma de níquel e Rio Itacaiúnas pela Mina S11D de ferro da Cia Vale do Rio Doce’, Relatório — UNIFESP (mimeograph, 2020), p. 5.

and a stated intention to physically exterminate minorities. Once again based on a militarization of the state, the strategy was now officially allied to fundamentalist religious action and rhetoric. These polluted waters always converged on the same recipe: eliminating indigenous peoples to allow the appropriation and exploitation of the land and its resources.

Jair Bolsonaro's Politics of Death

Once in power, Jair Bolsonaro put his 'genocidal verbiage' into action.⁷⁰ For indigenous people, the demolition of the democratic institutional framework began on the first day of government with the proposal to transfer the demarcation of Indigenous Lands from FUNAI to the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA), dominated by big landowners. The indigenous movement obstructed this attempt thanks to a widely publicized international campaign.⁷¹ Among others initiatives in the same field, one of the most serious was FUNAI IN (*Instrução Normativa* [Normative Instruction]) 9/2020, which provided for the legalization of invaded areas in non-ratified Indigenous Lands, putting at risk 'more than 237 TIs [...], [which] can be sold, subdivided, dismembered and invaded'.⁷²

The IN harmonized with Provisional Measure (MP) 910/2019, proposed by the executive and known as the '*MP da grilagem*', which, among other things, intended to provide the general legalization of illegally appropriated lands. Barred by pressure from society, the MP was revived in the Chamber of Deputies as PL (*Projeto de Lei* [Bill]) 2633/2020, once again evidencing the pact among the different branches of government against indigenous rights.⁷³

To ensure the exploitation of mineral, water and hydrocarbon resources and overcome impediments to legalized mining in TIs, the Bolsonaro government presented PL 191/2020, popularly known as the *PL da devastação* [Devastation Bill], which additionally regulates existing projects and allows the production of transgenic (GM) crops in TIs.⁷⁴

This legislation authorized all kinds of violation by introducing a politics of death that operates through increased invasions, deforestation, environmental degradation and direct physical extermination. During 2019, Bolsonaro's first

⁷⁰ Oiara Bonilla, 'La Vitalité des mondes possibles face à l'extrême-droite au Brésil', *Revue Terrestres*, 2 (2018). Available at <<https://www.terrestres.org/2018/11/15/la-vitalite-des-mondes-possibles-face-a-lascension-de-lextreme-droite-au-bresil/>> [accessed 18 May 2020].

⁷¹ 'Nenhuma gota a mais', available at <<https://www.nenhumagotamais.org/>> [accessed 18 May 2020].

⁷² Juliana de Paulo Batista, 'Funai edita medida que permite ocupação e até venda de áreas em Terras Indígenas', *Instituto Socioambiental* (14 April 2020). Available at <<https://www.socioambiental.org/pt-br/blog/blog-do-ppds/funai-edita-medida-que-permite-ocupacao-e-ate-venda-de-areas-em-237-terras-indigenas>> [accessed 19 May 2020].

⁷³ Capiberibe and Bonilla, 'A ocupação do Congresso'; Capiberibe, 'Um interminável Brasil colônia'.

⁷⁴ See Nurit Bensusan, 'PL da devastação ameaça alimentação dos índios ao liberar transgênicos em Terras Indígenas', *Instituto Socioambiental* (21 February 2020). Available at <<https://www.socioambiental.org/pt-br/blog/blog-do-isa/pl-da-devastacao-ameaca-alimentacao-dos-indios-ao-liberar-transgenicos-em-terras-indigenas>> [accessed 19 May 2020].

year in office, nine indigenous people were murdered,⁷⁵ most of them involved in surveillance of their lands. Also in 2019, record levels of destruction by forest fires were seen, with 76,720 outbreaks recorded across Brazil between January and August, up 85% from 2018.

At the same time, the government has been gradually starving FUNAI of funds, while purging the civil service to install loyalists. Qualified technicians occupying *cargos de confiança* [positions of trust]⁷⁶ and leadership in the indigenous agency (as well as in two environmental bodies, IBAMA and ICMBio) are being replaced by military, evangelicals and political associates with no expertise whatsoever. An ideological war is being waged in which those professionals are intimidated and defamed in notes and official statements, with grotesque speeches and accusations.⁷⁷ An example is the replacement of the head of the Coordination Office of Isolated Indians and Recent Contact (CGIIRC), which, as a rule, should be occupied by a specialized technician and FUNAI-tenured civil servant. Bolsonaro appointed to this post a pastor from the evangelical proselytizing organization *Missão Novas Tribos do Brasil* (MNTB — New Tribes of Brazil Mission).⁷⁸

Following the historic forest fires of 2019, the military wing of the government showed its claws by creating the National Legal Amazon Council to keep control over the region and prevent alleged international geopolitical interference, seeking to ensure its devastation project disguised as an economic project.⁷⁹ The council is composed exclusively of the military and ministers from areas deemed as strategic, headed by Vice President General Hamilton Mourão, and excludes civil society (indigenous people, traditional populations, anthropologists, environmentalists, etc.) as well as the Forum of Governors of the Legal Amazon.

* * * * *

Despite this machinery to annihilate people and their worlds, indigenous peoples have been taking a political stand. In 2013 they were the first to take to the streets, occupying Congress and foreshadowing the June demonstrations,⁸⁰

⁷⁵ Available at <<https://cptnacional.org.br/index.php/component/jdownloads/category/3-caderno-conflitos?Itemid=-1>> [accessed 5 May 2020].

⁷⁶ The Brazilian civil service includes, among other cases, positions filled by people approved in public competitions and positions filled by appointment of the government in office, the so-called positions of trust.

⁷⁷ See <<https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2020-02-07/de-trotsky-a-marx-o-discurso-ideologico-inflama-os-documentos-oficiais-da-funai-de-bolsonaro.html>> [accessed 20 May 2020].

⁷⁸ On how the activities of cross-cultural evangelical missions fit into the policies of the Jair Bolsonaro government see Artionka Capiberibe, 'Reaching Souls, Liberating Lands: Cross-cultural Evangelical Missions and Bolsonaro's Government', *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 15.2 (2021), available at <<https://brazilianpoliticalsciencereview.org/article/reaching-souls-liberating-lands-cross-cultural-evangelical-missions-and-bolsonaros-government/>> [accessed at 11 April 2021].

⁷⁹ See the decree at <http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2019-2022/2020/decreto/D10239.htm>.

⁸⁰ Capiberibe and Bonilla, 'A ocupação do Congresso'.

which would inaugurate a period of political turmoil that persists to this day. In January 2019, with the campaign '*Indigenous Blood. Not a single drop more*' (cf. footnote 72), they were also the first to speak out against a government that, just a few days into its term, was already trampling on their rights and equipping their executioners.⁸¹ If for some people they seemed hasty, the situation experienced with Covid-19 confirms how correctly they predicted the size of the multidimensional catastrophe that affects them today.

As the violence of the attacks on both legal and administrative fronts increases and their consequences are felt, the indigenous struggle grows as a significant force of opposition, with the party system showing signs of wear. In recent years APIB has ensured legal representation of indigenous peoples, mobilized national campaigns, attended major international artistic events, and systematically monitored the sessions of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, while continuing to organize annual ATL meetings, among other activities. The indigenous movement has become a key actor on the country's political scene. Two facts evidenced this in the 2018 election: Sônia Guajajara, executive coordinator of APIB, ran for vice president for the Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL), and Joênia Wapichana, an indigenous lawyer active in the Raposa Serra do Sol at the STF, was elected federal deputy for the Rede Sustentabilidade party (REDE).

The Covid-19 pandemic has raged as public policies and democratic institutions break down, leaving the entire country adrift. In this context, indigenous peoples have set an example of collective organization and preparation to withstand the impending cataclysm. Faced with the lack of assistance and a growing death toll, they are coordinating efforts to raise funds, procure and distribute protective equipment and food, and produce information campaigns. The deficient public services are aggravated by the perverse way in which SESAI handles the figures for indigenous victims of the disease. On the one hand, it does not account for cases occurring outside TIs, which increases underreporting, and, on the other, it does not classify deaths by indigenous groups. In view of this situation, APIB regularly publishes its own updated bulletin accounting for all cases, exposing the discrepancy with official figures.⁸²

In short, Alvanei Xirixana, the first official indigenous victim of Covid-19, is the symbolic expression of the ethnocide recipe experienced by indigenous peoples for centuries and denounced incessantly by Davi Kopenawa who, observing the increasing intensity of current diseases, warns us, as if heralding what we are now experiencing, that the fate of his people is not dissociated from

⁸¹ For a detailed view of the clashes between indigenous peoples and Bolsonaro, exposed during the election campaign, see Oiara Bonilla, 'La Vitalité des mondes possibles face à l'extrême-droite au Brésil' and 'Cataclysm presaged in Indigenous Land', Hot Spots, *Fieldsights*, Society for Cultural Anthropology, Series: Bolsonaro and the unmaking of Brazil, 28 January 2020. Available at <<https://culanth.org/fieldsights/cataclysm-presaged-in-indigenous-lands>> [accessed at 20 May 2020].

⁸² Available at <<http://quarentenaindigena.info/casos-indigenas/>> [accessed 5 May 2020].

ours: 'There is only one and the same sky above us. There is only one sun, only one moon. We live on the same land'.⁸³

This seems to be what motivates them to insist that we, non-indigenous people, realize that the earth does not exist to serve a humanity that, as Krenak explains, 'excludes all others and all other beings'. This is an awareness that can reverse the process of self-destruction in which we are engaged or, as Krenak proposes, 'postpone the end of the world'.⁸⁴

⁸³ Kopenawa and Albert, *A queda do céu*, p. 231.

⁸⁴ Krenak, *Ideias para adiar o fim do mundo*, p. 47.